sider cases on review after a defendant has been convicted.
Appellate courts determining cases in the context of review give the final stamp of approval to the validity of convictions. With appeal an almost automatic sequel to trial, it seems as if society must withhold its judgment about a defendant until the review process is finished. Contemporary appellate review has taken on the quality of an extension to the trial.
For their part, defendants and their attorneys shape their behavior to accommodate review as another stage in the long battle to avoid punishment. Defense counsel are constantly mindful of the need during trial to preserve the record for an eventual appeal. Moreover, every defense attorney has met with a case where he or she raises an issue at trial knowing full well it will not be successful, in hopes that he or she will find a more congenial audience on appeal.
Review not only provides additional opportunities for defendants to avoid conviction, it also has come to be seen as the final guarantor of the fairness of the criminal process. Appellate courts examine individual cases to ensure that convictions are not so in-fected with error that society should refuse to honor the trial court's judgment. Reversal on appeal is the quality control mechanism of the criminal justice system.
We have come to rely on review to shape the criminal process on more than an individual level. We invariably look to the opinions of reviewing courts, especially the appellate courts at the top of the judicial hierarchy, to announce the rules which must guide the behavior of the official actors in the criminal justice system. While confined to the context of affirming or reversing criminal convictions, these courts set forth the boundaries within which police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys must operate if they wish to conform to the rules.
The role of review in the contemporary criminal justice system is so pervasive that it is easy to assume this feature is a constitutional requirement. Review seems as fundamental an aspect of the system as trial by jury or the right to defense counsel.' After all, every state and the federal system provide some means of review to defendants in criminal cases. However, according to a long line of Supreme Court opinions, there is no constitutional mandate that states provide any type of review process for defendants convicted in their criminal courts. As far as the Constitution is concerned, a state could eliminate everything but its trial courts.
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A criminal trial process that literally adhered to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that there is no right to appeal in criminal cases would create an unacceptable risk ofjeopardizing defendants' rights to life and liberty, as each lower court judge would possess absolute, unreviewable discretion over the legal issues at trial. This model of unchecked power seems so at odds with the carefully bounded limits the Bill of Rights otherwise places on the power of the state that the dissonance is jarring. One only can wonder why a feature like review, which is so central to the legitimacy of the current criminal justice system, does not have a constitutional basis. This article's thesis is that the conventional argument about the lack of constitutional support for a right to appeal in criminal cases misreads history because it ignores the differences between the 1 Neither of these requirements is absolute, since the Constitution demands juries only in non-petty cases and defense attorneys in misdemeanors only when the defendant has received a sentence of imprisonment. But in the balance of cases, which encompass all serious criminal prosecutions, these features must be offered to the defendant.
2 The Constitution does speak to the issue of habeas corpus; it therefore implies the existence of a federal forum to review criminal cases that a state would not. However, traditional wisdom posits that the Constitution requires neither the states nor the federal government to review their own criminal convictions. eighteenth century view of how criminal courts should operate and our contemporary vision. The model of the criminal justice system with which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, and which they implemented in the first federal court system, contained many features that gave it the same advantages that appellate review provides today.
The first section of the article traces the genesis of the doctrine that the Constitution does not require review in criminal cases. The idea rests ultimately on an 1805 decision, which held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under the First Judiciary Act to entertain a writ of error in a criminal case. In order to evaluate how the Supreme Court's lack of jurisdiction over writs of error in criminal cases bears on the question of whether the framers' conception of due process would have encompassed a contemporary criminal trial without any possibility of review, the article's second section examines the early American criminal trial process in some detail. The third section of the article takes a closer look at the history of criminal litigation in the federal courts. It first examines the debates over the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the First Judiciary Act dealing with review in criminal cases. One of the important points that surfaces from this discussion is that criminal appeals were seen in some quarters as a danger to individual rights because of the fear that the government might seek review of an acquittal. The section then proceeds to examine four features of the early federal court's criminal process which gave it many of the characteristics of contemporary review. The fourth and final section of the article concludes that a fair reading of the historical record supports an argument that while review per se may not have been seen as a fundamental right of criminal defendants, there is nothing to suggest that the Due Process Clause was intended to condone leaving the final determination of all constitutional issues to an individual trial judge.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF REVIEW IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
One need not look very far to find a Supreme Court decision that holds there is no constitutional right to an appeal. A 1983 habeas corpus case,Jones v. Barnes, 3 is an apt example. The Court in Jones dealt with the refusal of an indigent defendant's appellate counsel to present in his brief or argument a non-frivolous issue that his client wished to use to attack the client's conviction. The majority opinion, which found that the attorney's refusal was not a constitutional violation, contained a statement which has been sprinkled liberally in one form or another throughout various cases dealing with the appellate process in the past thirty years: "There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal." 4 These twentieth century statements of the relationship between the Constitution and the right to appeal in criminal cases have their immediate genesis in an 1894 case, McKane v. Durston. 5 The appellant in McKane, which was another habeas corpus case, challenged a New York state court practice that denied defendants bail pending appeal as a matter of right. In rejecting the claim that this policy denied the defendant the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" guaranteed by Article IV of the Constitution, the Court stated:
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common-law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review. A citation of authorities upon the point is unnecessary. 6 The offhand dismissal of the constitutional claim in McKane stemmed from the fact that at the time of the decision, appellate review of criminal cases in the Supreme Court was only five years old.
For roughly the first hundred years of the federal courts, there was no right of review in criminal cases. Congress did not provide the circuit courts with the power to review federal criminal convictions until 1879. 7 Moreover, Congress waited until 1889 to give the 5 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 6 Id. at 687. It was unnecessary for the court to have made the statement in McKane concerning the lack of a constitutional requirement for the right to appeal. There was no reason to assert that defendants lacked a constitutional right to appeal in order to dispose of the far more limited question of whether they had an absolute right to bail pending appeal. Moreover, in none of the twentieth century cases repeating the dictum of McKane was the due process right to appeal a necessary ingredient of the Court's decision.
7 Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354.
The First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789, implemented the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by permitting writs of error to review judgments of the Circuit Courts'° in civil cases where the matter in controversy exceeded $2,000 in value." I The Act made no explicit provision for writs of error in criminal cases. 12 Whether litigants could obtain writs of error in federal criminal cases in the years immediately following the First Judiciary Act was an unresolved question. Justice Chase apparently thought writs were available. Presiding over the trial of James Thompson Callender for seditious libel in 1800, Chase remarked to defense counsel in explaining his refusal to allow a witness to testify:
[B]ut if I am not right, it is an error injudgment, and you can state the proceedings on the record so as to show any error, and I shall be the first man to grant you the benefit of a new trial by granting you a writ of error in the Supreme Court.' 3 Three years later, the Supreme Court actually entertained a writ of error in a criminal case. In United States v. Simms, 14 the prosecutor in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia brought a writ of error seeking to reverse a lower court decision which held that the indictment did not charge a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. ChiefJustice Marshall wrote the opinion, affirming the judgment for the defendant. Neither the Court nor the parties explicitly 8 Writs of error were the traditional format the common law provided for reviewing a lower court's judgment. The writ was an independent action in a higher court, conceptually quite unlike a contemporary appeal. The court which issued the writ first had to obtain the record of the proceeding in the trial court, and then had to determine if it was defective because of an error. 15 also originated in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. In the lower court, the judges sustained a demurrer to an indictment charging a District of Columbia magistrate with collecting fees illegally. When the government sought a writ of error, Chief Justice Marshall raised the question of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on his own initiative.
The prosecutor in More, John Mason, also had represented the government in Simms. Mason argued that Article III section 2 of the Constitution gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases of law (of which this was one) subject only to Congress' expressly promulgated exceptions. When Congress granted the Court the power to issue writs of error in civil cases, it never expressly forbade their use in criminal cases. Thus, Mason concluded, the Court had appellate jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil cases. In addition, Mason argued that the Court's authority to issue these writs was provided by the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave federal courts the power to issue all writs "necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law."' risdiction to entertain writs of error in criminal cases. 19 Marshall dismissed the authority of Simms on the ground that it had never raised the question of the Court's jurisdiction. His opinion relied solely on a construction of section 22 of the First Judiciary Act, which dealt with the Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ in civil cases. Marshall interpreted the Act's affirmative grant of jurisdiction in a limited class of cases to mean that Congress intended to withhold jurisdiction in the balance of cases in which the Constitution would have allowed the Court to exercise its appellate power.
0
He made no mention of the policy argument that Mason raised, nor did he refer to any other principle that would shed light on why he chose to restrict the Court's jurisdiction in such a manner. 21 Thus, if one traces back through the centuries from Jones to McKane to More, the principle that there is no constitutional right to review in criminal cases seems firmly based on history. It is indisputable that the original plan for the federal courts did not include a provision for review of criminal convictions, and, shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court found no reason to infer such a power. History seems a dead end to an argument that due process requires review of a criminal conviction.
To leave the trail at this point, however, would be premature. Although federal procedure in the eighteenth century did not permit writs of error for criminal cases, other features of the early criminal process did provide some of the advantages that contemporary review grants defendants convicted in modern courts. 
19
The Court in More need not have addressed the broad jurisdictional questions because it had a narrower ground on which to refuse to entertain the writ. Since it was the government that sought access to the court, not the defendant, the Court could have relied on the long recognized disfavor with which the common law viewed government appeals. In fact, this reason moved the Court to reach the same result as More in United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), when the government sought again to appeal a trial judge's dismissal of an indictment. Sanges came three years after the Court had been given jurisdiction to review criminal cases in general.
20 More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 173. 21 Justice Story speculated on the reason that the Supreme Court lacked appellate criminal jurisdiction in a case that arose 17 years after More. In Ex Parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822), a habeas corpus case in which the petitioner sought to obtain his release from confinement for contempt, Justice Story wrote in refusing to grant the writ:
[The Supreme Court] cannot entertain a writ of error, to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court, in any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence. And undoubtedly the denial of this authority proceeded upon great principles of public policy and convenience. If every party had a right to bring before this Court every case, in which judgment passed against him, for a crime or misdemeanor or felony, the course of justice might be materially delayed and obstructed, and, in some cases, totally frustrated. Id. at 42. 22 These features are described in section II.B, infra.
One cannot fully understand how the framers of the federal judicial system developed a policy denying review of criminal cases without some background on how the eighteenth century state courts dealt with the issue. The manner through which the states provided defendants in criminal cases with the advantages of review, either directly or indirectly, helped shape the federal view of the matter.
II. THE HISTORY OF REVIEW IN STATE CRIMINAL CASES
Since the Supreme Court relied entirely on the historical record to support its denial of a constitutional basis for a right to review in criminal cases, a detailed examination of the criminal procedure in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution is warranted. However, it is important to recall that appellate review in the eighteenth century was quite different than the process today.
Appeals, through which a higher court reviews the entire case developed at the trial level and has the power to render a judgment based on an overall assessment of the quality of the verdict, were not part of the common law tradition. 23 Instead, common law review was accomplished by the use of a writ of error, 24 which provided rather limited means of examining the record of a trial court for errors apparent on its face. It was, unlike an appeal, an original action, not a continuation of the case that had been litigated in the trial court. 2 5 The conception of the process was, literally, to try the record below to determine if an error existed. 2 6 Thus, it had a limited scope. For example, a court considering a writ of error could not consider any question concerning the evidence introduced at the trial, since the record did not include an account of the evidence. 2 7 The entire process lent itself to a quite mechanical application.
8
Writs of error were available at common law in criminal cases only in limited circumstances. Prior to 1700, the writ did not issue as a matter of right in any class of criminal cases. 29 Thereafter, misdemeanor defendants had free access to it, but defendants in felony cases needed the Attorney General's approval, which was a matter [Vol. 81 of grace. 3 0 In England, in fact, it was not until 1907 that felony defendants had the right to review their convictions.
1

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE CRIMINAL COURTS
Although the administration of justice in the new Republic was overwhelmingly a matter of state rather than federal concern, the state court systems largely existed to adjudicate civil controversies. Criminal cases in colonial days typically made up no more than ten percent of the docket of the general trial courts, 32 and there is no reason to believe that the mix of cases after the Revolution was any different. Nevertheless, each state, following common law practice, constructed a series of specialized courts for the adjudication of crime. While the same judges heard civil as well as criminal cases, the title of the court and the procedures it used depended on the type of case at trial. In civil cases, common pleas ruled, while in criminal cases, pleas of the crown governed procedure.
The organization of criminal courts in early America followed a pattern based on the English criminal justice system. 3 the Peace occupied the bottom rung. These local magistrates rarely were trained in the law, but were empowered to dispense justice to miscreants who faced only the most minor punishment. Justices of the Peace ordinarily did not preside over jury trials, which all the colonies guaranteed to those charged with non-petty offenses. 3 4 Juries for non-petty offenses were provided by a layer of courts that were termed the General Sessions of the Peace, or the Quarter Sessions. These courts met four times a year, and typically provided for a bench composed of selected justices of the peace. Sessions Courts had trial jurisdiction over misdemeanors, could impanel grand juries to return indictments, and could commit those charged with a crime to jail if they failed to meet their bail conditions. The Sessions Courts could not, however, try those who faced indictable offenses.
3 5
The judges who had the power to try these more serious cases had to operate under a broader grant of authority or commission. Three general commissions existed which empowered judges to adjudicate felony cases: Gaol Delivery, Oyer and Terminer, and Nisi Prius. These commissions were exercised mainly by judges riding circuit on a county-wide basis. The circuit judges, unlike the gentry who served as magistrates, were trained in the law, and were thought more competent to deal with the legal issues that might arise in complex and serious criminal matters. The pool of judges from which the circuits typically drew was composed of members of the jurisdiction's highest court. Even the justices of a colony's supreme court were expected to leave the seat of government and TORY (1973 Gaol Delivery operated as a clearing house for prisoners who had been indicted by a grand jury supervised by General Sessions. It possessed all of the power of a general jurisdiction felony trial court, except it lacked the ability to preside over its own grand jury. The power of Oyer and Terminer, to hear and determine, included the ability not only to try felony cases, but also to initiate them through the grand jury process.
Circuit judges also operated under a third grant of authority, acting as nisi prius courts. In a nisi prius case, the full bench would preside over the pre-trial pleadings, the most complex and challenging portions of the proceedings, before remitting the actual trial to the venue where the crime occurred. Nisi prius jurisdiction resulted from the highest court's exercise of original trial jurisdiction over the most serious felony cases. In some colonies, for example, all capital crimes had to be tried by the supreme court. 3 6 Not all of these trials took place before the full bench. Such a trial would have required all the witnesses to travel to whatever city the court typically sat in, and travel in colonial days presented a considerable travail. 3 7 Typically, the full bench would oversee the pre-trial pleadings. A circuit-riding judge would conduct the trial, and would proceed so far as to receive a verdict, but would withhold formal judgment. The case would then return to the full bench for entry of judgment and consideration of post-verdict challenges to the conviction.
B.
FEATURES OF STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS: HIGH COURT DECISIONS,
POST-CONVICTION REVIEW, AND MULTI-JUDGE BENCHES
Thus far, we have not identified a feature of the early American criminal court system that is strictly analogous to our criminal justice system's process of review. Yet, such mechanisms existed. A number of states allowed convicted defendants to appeal their cases and to receive trials de novo at a higher level in the court system. Defendants also could institute a separate action in a higher court using a writ of error, arguing that the judgment below was defective because of a mistake of law. However, even before examining how prevalent these forms of review were, the search for a historical answer to the inquiry how our forbearers viewed review requires an 36 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 33, at 24 (Massachusetts). 37 In Maryland, for example, it was a rough rule of thumb that witnesses would be allowed one day for each 15 miles that they had to travel to get to court. See C. BOND, supra note 33, at 94.
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[Vol. 81 examination of the differences between the way trials were conducted in the past and the way trials are conducted presently. Several aspects of the states' criminal trial process at the time of the adoption of the Constitution bear on the question of whether any historical support exists for features similar to modern day review.
High Court Decisions
The first significant feature of the eighteenth century American trial system was that a defendant in a serious case typically could obtain the resolution of an issue relevant to his trial by the highest judicial authority that existed in the jurisdiction. 38 A defendant in a non-petty case was not subject to the unchecked exercise of power by a lower court judge who might decide a legal point in a way that varied from the state's organic law.
Means existed to provide felony trial judges with the institutional point of view of the jurisdiction's highest court even when no formal contact occurred between the two levels of the court system. Although a trial might begin and end before a panel of circuit riding judges exercising the power of Gaol Delivery or Oyer and Terminer, the decisions the panel made were likely to reflect the view of the jurisdiction's highest court by virtue of the fact that the judges were members of the higher court as well. Sir Matthew Hale's History of the Common Law, a basic text found in the library of colonial lawyers, 39 explained one of the advantages of the circuit system:
[b]y this means their judgments and their administration of common justice, carry a consonancy, congruity and uniformity one to another; whereby both the laws and the administrations thereof, are preserved from that confusion and disparity that would unavoidably ensue, if the administration was by several incommunicating hands, or by provincial establishments .40 Supreme court judges not only conducted trials while riding circuit, but colonial and state high courts also conducted trials under a grant of original jurisdiction. The notion that the highest legal authority should function as a trial court was, in part, an inheritance from colonial legislatures. At the time of the Revolution, important criminal cases were tried by the legislative branch of the government, and this practice was within the recent memory of many colonial judges. In a number of the colonies, 4 1 the legisla-tures undertook the burden of resolving criminal cases themselves.
The practice of consolidating legislative and judicial functions was obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century. However, in most of the new states' court systems, the state's highest court typically conducted the trials of the most serious crimes. 4 2 Thus, any legal questions that arose in the course of these trials were resolved as if the defendant was given an automatic right of review to the state's supreme court. The advantage of modem review, which allows the state's ultimate legal authority the opportunity to ensure that a conviction is in accord with their interpretation of the law, was achieved by the colonial criminal justice systems' practice of empowering their high courtjudges with the sole responsibility for the case from its inception.
Even if a case did not originate in the highest judicial arena, it could be removed there for trial. In New York, for example, the state supreme court could order inferior tribunals to transmit the records of their pending cases to it for trial by the use of writs of certiorari. 43 Defendants also could instigate this removal process by seeking certiorari, and lower courts could invite the parties to do so in cases presenting difficult questions that appeared on the record. Thus, at either the request of the defendant or of the prosecution, the litigation could proceed in the state's highest court. 4 5 The last feature of the early criminal trial system that gave defendants the opportunity to obtain the judgment of their state's highest court, even without any review mechanism, was the common practice of trial judges reserving complex or novel questions of law and reporting them, either formally or informally, to the high court for a definitive resolution. The operation of nisi prius cases represented one form of this referral practice. In a nisiprius trial, though, regarded themselves as the highest courts in their jurisdictions"); see also E. Goodwin, supra note 33, at 76 (Connecticut); 0. CHITWOOD, supra note 33, at 19 (Virginia). 42 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 33, at 23 (Massachusetts). 43 Both the Circuit and General Sessions courts were the subject of this type of supervision. [Vol. 81 the high court itself instituted the mechanism for case referral. 4 6 When questions were reserved and reported, however, it was at the initiative of the trial judge, at a stage when the defendant could influence the forum in which the legal issue was determined.
One is struck by the degree to which the opinions decided in the context of such a referral system resemble those of contemporary appellate courts. In the 1790 New Jersey case of State v. Wells, 4 7 the defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter, moved for a new trial, alleging errors in both the judge's instructions to the jury and his rulings on admitting and excluding evidence. 48 The judge, who had doubts about whether he had misconceived the law, reserved and reported the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court for resolution. 4 9 The new trial motion, argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court, was denied on the ground that if an error had occurred at trial, it did not fundamentally affect the verdict. 50 Pennsylvania, 5 In Pennsylvania, a major mechanism for promoting uniformity was for judges to settle among themselves disputed points of law that arose in the course of a trial. When only a few judges of the state's supreme court sat as a trial bench and faced a controversial question of law, it was common for them to reserve their decision and report the matter to the full bench for resolution. extensive use of this referral mechanism to obtain more authoritative answers than an individual trial judge could provide.
Georgia was the only state that did not allow its judges to obtain advice from other members of the judiciary in making decisions at trial. The state constitution of 1798 established a superior court, which had exclusive and final jurisdiction in all criminal cases. 54 Superior court judges were prohibited from reserving and reporting vexing questions of law to the full bench of the superior court for resolution. In addition, legislation passed in 1801 prohibited the full bench from deciding such issues and required that the presiding judge dispose of the case in the county where the trial was held. 55 Although Georgia judges formally were required to determine the legal issues raised at trial themselves, they were able to consult on an informal basis. State v. Monaquas 5 6 is one example. The defendants in Monaquas, who were convicted of murder in the September 1805 term, filed a motion in arrest ofjudgment that presented the judge with an issue of first impression. Rather than deciding the case immediately after argument of counsel, the judge remanded the prisoners to the jail and announced that he would solicit the opinions of the judges of the other circuits of the superior court. At the May term of the court, the defendants were again set to the bar, and the judge delivered his opinion, sustained the motion, and ordered their discharge. 
Post-Conviction Motions
The second aspect of the early American criminal trial system that is similar to a feature afforded by modern day review was developed as a consequence of the format in which the defendant could raise objections to the proceedings. Defendants not only had an opportunity to raise legal points as they became relevant in the course of the trial, but they also had the ability to renew those points after conviction in a motion to arrest the judgment or in a motion for a new trial. The motion in arrest ofjudgment was confined to errors that were apparent on the record, 58 while a motion for a new trial 191 (1801 allowed the defendant to raise issues that were grounded in the evidence. 59 Through the use of these devices, defense attorneys could obtain for their clients a second look at a legal issue that had originally been decided against them. 6 0 The trial court's initial determination of an issue was not final. Although review was available only in front of the same group of judges, it existed nevertheless. 6 1 These post-conviction motions offered the judges an opportunity to reflect at greater length on a legal issue than was possible during the hectic pace of the trial itself. Thus, even without a formalized review process, time for reflection, a hallmark of the contemporary appellate process, clearly existed. As one commentator noted in 1824:
It is, of course, expected, that the verdict will be rendered as at nisi prius, under the unprepared, and sudden directions of the judge, who has no other opportunity of correcting his errors or those of the jury, but on a motion for a new trial.
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These post-conviction motions provided expansive remedial opportunities. A defendant could challenge his or her conviction on the ground of a defect in the indictment process, the means by which the jury was selected, lack ofjurisdiction in the court, or other procedural irregularities. 63 The niceties of eighteenth century criminal procedure gave defendants in some ways even greater opportunities to overturn their convictions than they have today. 4 For example, in an 1802 North Carolina case, State v. Carter, 6 5 the judges entertained a motion to arrest the judgment in a murder case on the ground that the indictment was faulty in describing the location of the mortal wound-it spelled the word "breast" at one point without the "a." Despite the fact that the judges who voted in the majority felt that their conclusion could "not easily ... be reconciled to good sense or sound understanding,-6 6 the court arrested the judgment.
Multi-Judge Trials
The third feature of eighteenth century criminal trials that raises a point of similarity with contemporary review is the number of judges who considered the legal issues raised by trial counsel. The legal arguments that defense attorneys made before trial (on pleas in bar and pleas in abatement), during trial (on points of evidence and rulings on instructions to the jury), and after conviction (on motions in arrest ofjudgment or for a new trial) were presented not simply to one judge but, as in a modern appellate argument, to a panel.
Trials of all but the most trivial offenses in state courts normally were held in front of a multi-judge bench. Typically, felony trials 64 See I. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 284 (1883) (The highly technical grounds on which defendants succeeded in overturning their convictions "[did mitigate, though in an irrational, capricious manner, the excessive severity of the old criminal law. There was a strange alternation in the provisions of the law upon this subject, by which irrational advantages were given alternately to the Crown and to the prisoner."). Rec. Ct. 1822) (defendant charged with passing a counterfeit note, defense chiefly relied upon a defect in the indictment that in spelling the name of the cashier who received the note, the dot over the letter "i" in the name Tim was omitted; the jury acquitted the defendant on that basis).
[Vol. 81 would be held in a court whose judges were members of the state's highest tribunal. The reports of these early trials chronicle interchanges between the attorneys and the judges, and among the judges themselves, in ways that mirror the behavior of multi-judge appellate courts today. 67 As reported by the note-takers, the judges spelled out their reasoning at length, engaged in prolonged discussions among themselves and with counsel, and often disagreed with each other. 68 The methods used by judges to resolve disagreements among themselves varied. When voting on how to resolve an issue, for example ruling on a motion, the majority (if there was one) prevailed. 69 When multi-judge trial courts were called upon to perform functions that did not require a vote, the judges performed seriatum. One early court reporter noted, for example, how the practice of three judge trial courts in New Hampshire sometimes lead to the jury receiving differing charges from each judge. 70 The process by which the panel heard arguments more closely resembled a modern appellate court than a trial session. For example, four of the five members of the Pehnsylvania Supreme Court sat together as a trial bench. Hugh Brackenridge, one of the first justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, described how such a court operated in the context of a complaint about the inefficiency of having more than one judge making decisions in a trial context; he explained:
A paper offered in evidence must be read by the presiding judge, and a note taken of it. It then comes to the second who must read, and note also; and to a third, and a fourth who has the same right to read and note; and, if he does not, at least read, he is under a disadvantage in 67 See, e.g., State v. Norris, 2 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 429 (1796) (multi-judge murder trial in which judges hear arguments on points of law and direct questions to counsel); Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 417 (Pa. 1802) (argument before Justices Yeates and Smith in perjury case on motion in arrest ofjudgment). 68 See, e.g., Norris, 2 N.C. (2 Hayw.) at 429-33 (discussion among two presiding judges and counsel for both sides on the right of the defendant to put questions to members of the venire about whether they had already expressed an opinion on the defendant's guilt). 69 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (I Call) 555, 560 (1799) (Statement of Judge Pendleton, outvoted 2-1, that "My opinion, therefore, is, that thejudgment ought to be affirmed; but, as a majority of the Court differ from me, it must be reversed."). 70 Reporter's Note, 55 N. H. (7 Shirley) 6-8 (1876). In one notable civil case, the disagreements in the jury instructions the judges delivered contributed to three successive hung juries, until on the fourth trial the two associate judges agreed to sit by in silence and allow the chief judge to charge the jury by himself. Id. at 7. See also Commonwealth v. Addison, 4 Dall. 225 (Pa. 1801) ("[e]veryJudge has a right, and emphatically, that is his duty, to deliver his sentiments upon every subject that occurs in Court ... it would be indecent and improper, in any presidingJudge, to attempt to prevent his associates from the exercise of this right; from the performance of this duty.").
understanding the cause. By the time it came to a fourth, which was my place, I found by both bar, and country, such an impatience at the vexatious delay, that I was led to dispense with looking at it at all; and to content myself with catching the substance from the argument of the counsel, or the hearing it cursorily read by them, without seeing it, which at all times fixes the impression of the contents more forcibly upon the mind. 7 1 While Brackenridge's lament certainly paints a picture of an inefficient judicial operation, it also describes a process that provides some of the advantages of modem review by having more than one judge make the decision.
The combination of these three aspects of the trial system resulted in a mechanism that greatly resembled modem appellate review. In fact, South Carolina's judicial system provided such a combination as an explicit alternative to review of a criminal case after conviction. South Carolina did not offer defendants in either criminal or civil cases the opportunity to obtain writs of error or appeals in order to review the judgments against them. 72 It did, however, provide multi-judge courts, post-conviction motions, and an institutionalized version of referring a case for report. South Carolina's courts found the result a "more speedy and less expensive" 7 3 alternative to traditional review, with just as expansive a remedy.
Defendants in criminal cases in post-Revolutionary South Carolina could raise any legal issue they contended bore on the validity of their conviction before the Constitutional Court. 74 Article X of the constitution provided that at the conclusion of the circuits where superior court judges held trial, all the judges would meet en banc, once in Columbia and once in Charleston, "for the purpose of hearing and determining all motions which may be made for new trials, and in arrest ofjudgments, and such points of law as may be submitted to them."
The Constitutional Court was composed of six judges 76 who sat as a full bench. 77 The trial proceedings they reviewed had generally 
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[Vol. 81 been conducted by one of their members. 78 Although the proceedings in the Constitutional Court technically were continuations of the original trials, 7 9 the judges' decisions had the same impact as if they were reviewing a case on appeal. The reports of the interchanges between counsel and the judges give a picture of the type of argument that easily could have occurred in a twentieth century appellate court. The reports show that the court considered the widest range of legal issues. Its cases dealt not only with technical legal claims that would have been cognizable on a writ of error, like a defect in the indictment, but also with issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, jury misconduct, and claims that newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial.
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This right to have one's case considered by an en banc tribunal gave South Carolina's criminal courts a unique cast among the thirteen states. 8 ' It illustrates, however, the degree to which the existing structure of the trial system could provide a defendant with the advantages of review without resorting to the eighteenth century devices of an appeal for trial de novo or the use of writs of error.
C. REVIEW MECHANISMS: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
The criminal justice systems established by each state after the Revolution were the direct successors of colonial courts that had operated under a regime of direct accountability to the King or Queen. Under colonial rule, defendants convicted of a crime had access, at least in theory, to seek redress based upon errors in the proceedings both across the Atlantic, to the Crown, and to the royal government in the colonies.
The ultimate forum for review of all colonial court judgments rendered was the King or Queen, acting through the authority of the Privy Council. The availability of this type of review was a regular feature of colonial charters. 8 2 This review, however, usually was confined to misdemeanor cases where a fine exceeding a certain amount was imposed as a sentence. Privy Council were attempted by defendants convicted of serious felonies. Two men convicted of murder in a Pennsylvania court in 1718, for example, presented an unsuccessful appeal to the Privy Council on the ground that Quakers who sat on the petit jury had not taken a proper oath.
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Direct appeals to the Crown, even when theoretically possible, were too inconvenient and costly to be of much practical significance. 8 5 Rhode Island was the only colony whose citizens made any extensive use of this means of review in criminal cases.
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Within the boundaries of individual colonies, however, a much greater flow of cases from the courts to the executive took place. The Governor and Council operated more or less as an analogy to the House of Lords in England, and typically held themselves out as a court of last resort. Judgments of conviction were overturned both on grounds similar to a modern executive's exercise of clemency and on the basis of some perceived flaw in the judicial process. In Pennsylvania, for example, this means of review steadily increased after legislation in 1718 required far ranging application of capital punishment, and the minutes of the council are full of petitions for relief from capital convictions. Even after the break from England, some states kept open a legislative avenue of review. At the start of the Revolution, the New Jersey Constitution provided for the existence of the same courts as under English rule. New Jersey gave the Governor and Council responsibility as a Court of Appeals of last resort for all causes of law, specifically providing that they "possess the power of granting pardons to criminals after condemnation in all cases of treason, felony or other offences. ' '8 8 Where a formal grant of this type of power was not expressly given to the executive, it was still possible for defendants to ask the court to recommend that the executive authorities grant a pardon. The most expansive type of formal review was an appeal which allowed the defendant to obtain a trial de novo. 9 7 Appeal, which was not part of the criminal common law tradition, existed solely as the result of specific legislation. All of the New England states as well as North Carolina provided defendants convicted before a lower court the right to obtain this form of review. Massachusetts, the most influential of the New England states, established the model. 98 At each level of the Massachusetts court system, defendants were alJohns. Cas. 180, 181 (N.Y. 1797) ("[t]his case is a case of felony in which consideration of policy and expediency would prevent this court from granting a new trial. In such cases, the usual course is to recommend the convict for pardon."). 0 3 a slave, who was convicted in Quarter Sessions for the rape of a white woman and was sentenced to death, moved for an appeal to the Superior Court. His motion was denied. In an effort one can surmise was either an act of loyalty or an attempt to protect an asset, the defendant's owner obtained a writ of certiorari and a supersedeas, which stayed the execution of the sentence. In the Superior Court, the question of the jurisdiction to hold a trial de novo was reserved and reported. The judges eventually held that the defendant had an absolute right to a trial de novo, and the Superior Court had the power to issue whatever writs were necessary to protect that right. Where statutory authority to issue writs of error in criminal cases did not exist, courts relied on the common law. The Virginia courts, for example, interpreted the statute dealing with writs of error to apply only to civil cases, a construction that made sense in light of the statute's requirement that the judgment exceed a certain dollar amount. 1 4 Under their common law power, however, the state courts could entertain writs of error without regard for the value of the judgment. ' 
1820).
Lowber presented the question whether the High Court or the Supreme Court was the appropriate forum from which to seek a writ of error challenging a conviction in Sessions. The court declared the statute of 1760 giving the Supreme Court such jurisdiction, which had been in force since its enactment, unconstitutional on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the mandate given to the High Court under the 1792 constitution. The system described in Lowber allowed defendants convicted of non-capital crimes in either Sessions or the General Court to obtain a writ of error in the High Court either with the consent of the Attorney General or with the permission of a High Court judge. In Lowber itself, the Attorney General refused to agree to the writ, but the court allowed it. In capital cases, though, Delaware followed the common law rule that only with the prosecution's consent could a defendant obtain a writ of error. [Vol. 81
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
F. ATTITUDE TOWARD REVIEW
Of the thirteen original states, only Georgia did not incorporate some form of review mechanism into its criminal justice system. In fact, it was not until 1848 that Georgia established a state supreme court." 17 The only type of review that a Georgia defendant could obtain was either to request a new trial or to move for an arrest of judgment before the single Superior Court judge who presided over his trial. '1 8 Part of the explanation for the lack of review in Georgia's postRevolution criminal justice system was widespread antipathy to the idea of appellate courts in general. In particular, Georgians viewed the United States Supreme Court with extreme disfavor due to the political reversals the state government had suffered there. This aversion to high courts played a role in the internal decision to restrict criminal courts to the trial level." t 9 A number of other factors were important as well, such as a fear that a centralized court would favor the rich over the poor and thereby create an expensive barrier to the resolution of civil cases. 1 20 Since the highest level of the trial court was already involved in the resolution of criminal cases, without an appellate court or centralized meeting of the full trial bench, no effective review existed at all.
The Relevance of Individual Rights
The remaining twelve states did not share Georgia's attitude toward review. Review played a role in all of their criminal justice systems. The reason that review was widespread, however, did not reflect contemporary concerns. Although the modem rationale for review in criminal cases places great emphasis on the need to ensure that each individual defendant receives a fair trial, this atomistic view of the process played only a minor role in eighteenth century judicial thought.
Review was not seen as the great protector of defendants' rights for a number of reasons. One major factor was the idea that any sort of review would be too late to help the defendant. As one early Two factors combined to reach this result. First, the review process required extensive amounts of time. The reviewing courts were often far away, and sat infrequently. 12 2 Second, at common law a writ of error did not operate to suspend the judgment of the court below. 123 In order to prevent the defendant from suffering the penalty his sentence provided for, either the appellate court specifically had to issue a writ of supersedeas 12 4 or the trial court had to grant the defendant a reprieve. 125 Neither course was a familiar one at common law, and it took some time for American judges to adopt them as solutions to the problem. Judge Brackenridge of Pennsylvania complained about the issue in 1816:
With us ... no writ or certiorari, or writ of error, shall be available to remove an indictment, or stay execution of the judgment in any criminal case; unless the same shall be specially allowed . . . Some time must intervene before application can be made ... and before the writ of error can be heard; and in the mean time the sentence must go into part execution, which is a little like a person, so far as this goes, being hanged, or whipped first, as the phrase is, and tried afterwards. For where there was error, there can not be said in strictness, to have been a trial. Brackenridge went on to suggest as a solution, that the trial judge 121 Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461 (1803). At common law, the fact that a defendant already may have been executed would not have ended the review process. The defendant's heirs could still maintain a writ of error in order to avoid the consequences to them of an attaint and a corruption of blood, which would have deprived them of their inheritance. See [Vol. 81 grant bail to the defendant, at least in the case of misdemeanors. 127 Another major reason why the early American criminal justice system did not look upon review as a major component in the protection of defendants' rights was its view of how the trial system operated. If the trial system was seen as providing all the protection a defendant would ever need, then there was no reason to extend the review process to criminal cases. One explanation for this attitude stems from the system of having circuit riding members of the state's highest court conduct the most serious criminal trials. When the high court judges viewed the quality of the trial bench, there hardly could be cause for alarm that a conviction in the trial court was the result of the misapplication of the law by judges lacking in training or wisdom.
A Virginia court in 1803, in Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 128 relied on just this reasoning in narrowly construing the right to appeal to include only civil cases. In Bedinger, a clerk of court, who had obtained his office by promising to share his fees with a justice of the peace in return for that magistrate's vote to appoint him to his office, appealed his bribery conviction to the Court of Appeals. In seeking to have the high court review his conviction by an appeal, the defendant advanced a method of review that was not part of the common law tradition in criminal cases.
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In the eyes of the appellate judges, there was little cause for concern about the misapplication of the law by the trial judges of the Virginia General Court. As the court to which the original Virginia legislature gave jurisdiction over the most serious offenses, it 127 Id. Courts were reluctant to bail defendants who had been convicted of a felony, simply to allow them their freedom pending the resolution of a review process. See, e.g., State v. Connor, 2 Bay's (S.C.) 34, 36 (1796) (court had no discretion to grant bail after conviction, because presumption of innocence no longer applied and no security was sufficient to assure defendant's presence). By the first quarter of the next century, courts were willing to stay the execution of a judgment to allow a writ of error, by analogy to the common law power used with cases of pregnant women. Another explanation for the attitude that review was not needed to protect defendant's rights also stemmed from how the judges viewed the trial process. While they conceded that trial courts made mistakes, they were confident that it was rare for a truly innocent person to suffer a conviction. Judge Roane noted in Bedinger that many parts of the trial system served to prevent injustice:
The tenderness and leaning of our code in favour of the criminal, the uncontroulable power of the jury to acquit in a criminal case, the pardoning power of the executive, and the objection to great delays in the execution of the criminal law, fully justify [the policy of not permitting an appeal in criminal cases].'
This attitude toward the inerrant justice of the trial system sur- vived into the nineteenth century. An expression by a New York City lower court judge in the early 1800's was typical:
Nor is there any danger that innocence will suffer for want of a writ of error. Criminal proceedings have thrown around the innocent so many guards, that the writ of error is almost useless.... if there be the least irregularity in the proceedings, the court must either grant a new trial, or recommend the party to a pardon. It may be said, with truth, that probably an instance cannot be found on record, of an innocent man suffering, for want of a writ of error in a criminal case.
7
While trials were viewed as providing ample protection for innocent defendants, especially through the provision of local juries, writs of error provided such a narrow scope of review that they often reversed convictions of the palpably guilty for the most trivial of reasons. 13 8 It is not surprising that the eighteenth century's conception of review in criminal cases played a different role in terms of protecting defendants' rights than the contemporary appellate process.
The early reports do contain arguments in favor of review based on the severe consequence a conviction has for the individual defendant. However, when courts or prosecutors sounded this theme, it was used as an instrumental device towards ends other than protection of defendants' rights.
137 Lavett v. People, 7 Cow. 339, 343 (N.Y. 1827). It is worth noting that among the safeguards mentioned by Recorder Riker in Lavett was the fact that the jury was the final authority on the law as well as the facts. 138 See R. POUND, CRIMINAL supra note 90, at 161. One can see this sentiment expressed in the opinions ofJustice Yeates of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Spangler v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 533 (Pa. 1811), for example, the court considered a writ of error from a conviction for larceny of bank notes. The defendant argued that the indictment was defective because it did not specify the bank which issued the notes. Justice Yeates, concurring in the judgment reversing the conviction, stated:
Where an indictment states a criminal charge with sufficient certainty, so that the party may be fully informed thereby of the facts he is called upon to answer, and prepare for his defence, it is disreputable to the administration of the law that he should be suffered to escape with impunity for a mere slip of form, totally unconnected with the merits of the case. At the same time we well know, that too great a laxity in matters of this nature, will lead to consequences dangerous to innocence.
To preserve uniformity of decisions we are necessarily obliged to follow precedents; the utmost uncertainty would ensue from our disregarding them. Id. at 537. In White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179 (Pa. 1813),Justice Yeates dissented from the judgment of the court on a writ of error which reversed the conviction in a murder case on the ground that the precept to the sheriff commanding him to compel the attendance of twenty-four "sober and judicious" persons to serve as jurors was defective because it did not specify that the petit jurors as well as the grand jurors should be from Cumberland County. justice Yeates stated:
Upon the whole, imperious duty constrains me to declare, that there does not appear to me such error on this record, as would justify me in reversing the judgment against the prisoner. I entirely assent to the opinion, that too great nicety in proceedings is a reproach to the criminal law of any civilized country. Id. at 189.
The Virginia Court of Appeals decision in Commonwealth v. Caton is an apt example.' 3 9 In Caton, the court confronted the issue of whether it could resolve questions reported to it in criminal cases. A General Court had convicted several men of treason; however, before the sentence of death could be executed, the House of Delegates issued a pardon with which the state Senate did not concur. The trial judges reported the question of the validity of the pardon to the Court of Appeals. The issue was a highly charged political controversy. Before it could reach the merits, however, the Caton court first had to resolve a challenge to its jurisdiction to entertain questions referred to it in a criminal case. The court noted that although the language in the statute authorizing this procedure did not explicitly mention criminal jurisdiction, it would make no sense to confine its use to civil matters. Judge Pendleton, President of the Court, wrote:
If I were to consider this question in a political light, I should wonder indeed, that disputes about property to the value of £50, which dwindles into nothing when compared with the subject which gives rise to the present discussion, might be removed for difficulty, and that in a case where the judges are to decide between the safety of the state on the one hand, and the life of a citizen on the other, however, overwhelmed with doubts and difficulties, they must go through them and determine without that assistance which they might wish to have on the occasions; the reason for such assistance, must increase in proportion to the magnitude of the subject.
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While the opinion used an argument couched in language that referred to the effect of a conviction for the defendant, the underlying force that propelled the court to expand its jurisdiction was on other grounds. The court politically manipulated the argument about the consequences of criminal cases to bolster its conclusion that it was the appropriate institution to decide important legal issues. Especially in light of the fact that the court declared the pardon invalid, one cannot fairly read the decision as expressing a concern that review is necessary to protect defendants' rights. 14 1 139 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). 140 Id. at 16. 141 John Mason, the prosecutor in United States v. More, sounded a similar theme before the United States Supreme Court when he argued for writs of error in matters where life or liberty were at stake by noting they were available in civil cases where only property was at issue. However, Mason used this argument in the service of a request that the Court grant a writ of error to overturn a circuit court decision that favored the defendant. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion rejecting Mason's claim did not even allude to this argument. See supra note 15. One also find references in arguments of defense counsel that review was necessary to serve the purpose of correcting errors. Where the defendant's attorney made this type of claim, it was likely to be based on a real concern for the defendant's rights. One can see this in the report of a
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Review and the Institutional Need for Uniformity
The major justification for review of criminal convictions in the eighteenth century rested on institutional rather than individual concerns. The eighteenth century courts in a number of states articulated one major justification for the various types of review that existed: promoting uniformity. Review provided a means for ensuring the uniform application of the law. While each of the newly formed states could rely on its colonial common law inheritance to guide its trial judges, the central courts saw the need to ensure that all the members of the judiciary moved in the same direction. Uniformity not only harmonized the law as an instrument of social control but served an important political function well. As an integral part of the structure of the newly declared state governments, the state courts had to maintain power over the direction of criminal prosecutions as a means of securing political power in the nascent Republic.
One can find repeated explanations in the early case reports of the organizational need to have some sort of review process for criminal cases. The importance these early trial judges placed on getting the opinion of the full bench was expressed in Respublica v. Cleaver. 14 2 In Cleaver, the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania denied the defendant's motion to quash a larceny indictment, but noted that if the defendant was convicted, "[w]e can keep the matter under advisement until we can consult our brothers in bank, and form a satisfactory opinion on the subject. The code of criminal justice should remain fixed and certain on the most solid grounds." defendant, they had granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.'
The possibility that a Sessions Court might have the power to grant a new trial presented a grave problem to the Supreme Court. Because of the procedural limitations on the means by which it could supervise lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court would have been unable to review the grant of a new trial. 14 6 The Court clearly saw the need to enforce its view of the law on all the inferior tribunals. The Supreme Court recognized that:
The jurisdiction of every country requires a regular gradation of courts and a common centre ofjudicial power. This is essential to its existence, and to preserve consistency and harmony in the administration ofjustice. . . if [lower court] proceedings were not subject to be here reviewed, we might find different rules of law and of justice in almost every county. This would introduce disorder and confusions, and be inconsistent with a regular and uniform administration of justice. 1 4 7
Thus, the need for institutional uniformity and consistency exerted a strong influence in the creation of a formalized review process for criminal cases.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
It was against the backdrop of the existing state criminal justice systems that the first federal courts were formed. Initially, the federal government under the Articles of Confederation did not have its own judicial system. It relied on the state courts to try federal cases in the first instance. 148 The central government became involved only in cases of prize and capture, a specialized branch of admiralty law dealing with ships seized at sea. In 1775, Congress created a Court of Appeals in Prize Cases to hear appeals from state courts in these matters. 149 Criminal cases, however, remained completely within the jurisdiction of the state court systems.
It was not until the Constitutional Convention met that the shape of an independent federal judiciary was formed. The structure of the federal criminal justice system was a result of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the First Judiciary Act. The framers 145 Id. did not explicitly provide for review of convictions in criminal cases in any of these documents. However, it does not follow that the lack of an explicit appellate mechanism in criminal cases was an indication that the framers believed that review of federal convictions was of no significance to the rights of defendants. Far from indicating a lack of concern for defendants' rights, the absence of appellate review may have been a consequence of fear of the power of the new central government. Appellate review, especially the appeal process which involved a new trial, was viewed with suspicion in many quarters as a device which had the potential to limit the rights of defendants because of the prospect that the prosecution could obtain a new trial after an acquittal. In addition, the need for traditional appellate mechanisms was obviated in the federal courts, as well as in the state courts, by the existence of a number of means at the trial level to provide defendants with many of the advantages of modern day review. The discussion of the federal system will begin with a look at the development of the federal judiciary; it then will examine the operation of the early federal criminal courts.
A. THE CONSTITUTION
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention had a basic knowledge of the judicial structure of their own states and how it operated.' 50 Thus, the delegates would have known about the common law tradition that denied review to felony defendants5 1 as well as the varied means of review that took hold in the American states. 152 The records of the Convention debates reveal little evidence of a concern for grafting some means of review of criminal cases onto the structure of the federal judiciary which was in the process of being created by the convention delegates. 5 3 The major topics of controversy that emerged concerning the court system were the method of appointing judges and their tenure in office, whether inferior federal courts should exist, the right to trial by jury, and the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over questions 150 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 207.
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See id. at 610. 152 See id. at 207. Not all of the members of the Constitutional Convention were lawyers; however, they were educated in the general structure of the law. Blackstone's Commentaries was considered a staple of an educated gentleman's library, and it is safe to say that all of the delegates to the Convention were familiar with it. See R. POUND, CRIMINAL, of fact. 154 Resolution of the issue of Supreme Court review in criminal cases was not a matter of great concern. It was not, however, completely ignored.
Both the proponents and opponents of a strong federal judiciary first proposed plans for the structure of a court system that included Supreme Court review of what was contemplated to be a major class of federal criminal cases. Edward Randolph of Virginia put forward a plan which formed the basis for much of the early discussion. It provided for inferior federal courts "to hear [and] determine in the first instance," and for a supreme tribunal "to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas .... ,,155 Since not even the federalists proposed that the central government's interest in criminal matters should intrude into areas traditionally policed by the states, crimes on the high seas were a significant portion of what the delegates would have contemplated of federal criminal law. 15 6 When Randolph's provision was debated, it was embroiled in the controversy over whether inferior federal courts would supplant the existing power of state courts. As a consequence, Randolph offered a substitute resolution that omitted any explicit reference to piracy and felony jurisdiction at both levels of the proposed federal courts.
supreme judicial tribunal that gave it appellate jurisdiction in cases involving piracies and felonies on the high seas. 158 This language also failed to survive the debates. No further reference to review in criminal cases appeared. 159 The lack of attention devoted to review in criminal cases was due, in part, to the resolution reached by the Convention on the heated issue of the existence of inferior federal courts. The establishment of federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, was not required by the Constitution; instead, the issue was delegated to Congress for resolution. The solution to this controversy was a compromise between the contending factions. 1 6 0 Since the existence of inferior federal courts might never have come to pass, it was unnecessary for the Convention to address the question of reviewing the judgments of those courts.
Thus, the ultimate resolution of the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution left open the question of the availability of review in criminal matters. The Constitution, which was sent out to the states for ratification, provided only that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." 16 1 The ratification process in Maryland and New York, however, did call attention to the issue of review in criminal cases. Luther Martin spoke in the Maryland Assembly against ratification on the ground that the Constitution's grant of appellate jurisdiction with respect to questions of fact nullified the right to a jury in criminal cases. He argued that even if inferior federal courts were established for the trial of federal crimes, ajury would only be a needless expense, since, on an appeal, the determination of that jury, even on questions offact, however honest and upright, is to be of no possible effect .... If, therefore, even in criminal cases, the general government is not satisfied with the verdict of the jury, its officer may remove the prosecution to the Supreme Court, and there the verdict of the jury is to be of no effect, but the judges of this court are to decide upon the fact as well as the law .... ,11
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Martin saw a deliberate plan behind this dilution of the right to a jury, and attributed it to the Federalists' fear that the local population from whom the juries would be selected would be too partial to In New York, Robert Yates used the pseudonym "Brutus" to write about the Constitution's grant of appellate power to the Supreme Court. One of Brutus' letters addressed Article III, section 2 and its application to criminal convictions:
The appellate jurisdiction granted to the supreme court, in this paragraph, has justly been considered as one of the most objectionable parts of the constitution .... By this article, appeals will lie to the supreme court, in all criminal as well as civil causes. This I know, has been disputed by some; but I presume the point will appear clear .... If then this section extends the power of the judicial, to criminal cases, it allows appeals in such cases .... I believe it is a new and unusual thing to allow appeals in criminal matters. It is contrary to the sense of our laws, and dangerous to the lives and liberties of the citizen. As our law now stands, a person charged with a crime has a right to a fair and impartial trial by ajury of his country, and their verdict is final. If he is acquitted no other court can call upon him to answer for the same crime. But by this system, a man may have had ever so fair a trial, have been acquitted by ever so respectable ajury of his country; and still the officer of the government who prosecutes, may appeal to the supreme court. The whole matter may have a second hearing. By this means, persons who may have disobliged those who execute the general government, may be subjected to intolerable oppression. 164 Other New York anti-federalists echoed these views.' 6 5 In response, the Constitution's supporters at the New York ratification convention offered a resolution expressing the true intent of the document to be that the Supreme Court, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, could not authorize a second trial in criminal cases.
6
The implication of this argument against review in criminal cases is quite interesting because it sheds light on why the initial scheme of the federal courts lacked this feature. If one is to take the argument at face value, which may not be entirely warranted since the anti-federalist letters of the time were not above erecting straw men, 167 liberty. Although appeals of acquittals by the prosecutor were by no means the norm in the state court systems, there were instances where they did occur. 168 Thus, it was possible to see a danger of prosecutorial abuse in Article III's language concerning appeal on questions of fact. Since the Bill of Rights was not part of the Constitution at the time of ratification, one explanation for the absence of any feature ensuring review in criminal cases may be the fear that Martin and Brutus identified.' 6 9 B.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS As with the debates over the Constitution, nothing in the Congressional debates over the Bill of Rights directly addressed the question of review of criminal convictions. The debates did address the Supreme Court's appellate power, but the discussion was confined to a concern over the effect it would have on civil cases. The debate recognized a common fear that appealing one's case to Washington would allow those rich enough to afford it an opportunity to wear down litigants of ordinary means.' 7 0 Madison, in fact, proposed as one of the original amendments to the Constitution an article limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction to cases where the matter in controversy involved more than one thousand dollars.
1 7 '
The context of the ensuing discussion, however, was confined entirely to civil cases. Yet, the debates on the Bill of Rights dealt with an issue relevant to review in criminal cases; namely, the question of multiple trials. The original version of the amendments to the Constitution stated: "No person shall be subject, except in case of impeachment, to more than one trial or one punishment for the same offense ...."172 While this language solved the problem of a potential government appeal of an acquittal that had troubled Luther Martin and Robert Yates 173 , it raised another problem in the minds of Representatives Benson and Sherman. They believed that this language would abrogate the right of a defendant to move in arrest ofjudg- ment and obtain a new trial in order to correct an error. 174 A motion to strike the language dealing with "one trial" was defeated. 1 
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In the final form, however, the original, clumsy language was stricken by the Senate, and the more traditional common law maxim dealing with twice being put in jeopardy was inserted in its place.' 7 6
C. THE FIRST JUDICIARY ACT
The first Congress began work on the legislation that put flesh on the skeleton of judicial authority described in the Constitution well before the Bill of Rights took effect. In April, 1789, the Senate appointed a committee to write a bill organizing the judiciary.' 77 The Bill of Rights, with its ban on double jeopardy, did not take effect until Virginia ratified the amendments in December, 1791 (although it was approved by the Senate in September, 1789). 178 The only reference in the record of the discussion of the FirstJudiciary Act on the issue of whether the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction should extend to criminal cases came from the writings of members of the committee charged with drafting the legislation. Caleb Strong of Massachusetts wrote an account of the initial stages of the bill that included this description of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction: "Writs of Error from the Circuit to the Supr. Court in all Causes not criminal of which the Circuit Court has original Cognizance and the matter in Dispute does not exceed 2000 Dolrs."' 17 9 However, the language expressly excluding criminal cases from the scope of the writ of error was not included in any of the existing drafts of the Act.
An official record of the Senate proceedings concerning the First Judiciary Act does not exist. There is an indication, however, that at least one Senator mentioned the lack of appeal in criminal 174 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 436. Both Benson and Sherman were lawyers and thus would have been familiar with the traditional formulation of the common law's protection against jeopardy. 175 Id. 176 Id. at 448. The fifth amendment addresses the protection against double jeopardy in the following language: "[nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST 
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More, namely that the Supreme Court did not have the power to issue writs of error in criminal cases. Other reasons have been advanced to explain the omission of criminal cases in section 22 of the FirstJudiciary Act. Some historians have attributed it to the legislators' blind adoption of the common law position found in Blackstone. 186 However, if that was the case, it is puzzling that writs of error were not permitted even in federal misdemeanor cases, where the common law would have granted them as a matter of right. Speculation also exists that the lack of writs of error in criminal cases may have been a consequence of the hostility in anti-federalist quarters to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in general. 18 7 Although, without the fear expressed by Martin and Yates concerning the prosecutor's use of .review, it would seem that writs of error in criminal cases would have worked to weaken the central government.
D. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD OF THE FIRST FEDERAL COURTS
While the first form of our criminal justice system under the Constitution did not include a means for defendants to obtain review of their convictions, it does not mean that the system lacked all of the features we associate with contemporary review. If one is looking at the historical record for an original understanding of how due process viewed the finality of a criminal trial and the need for review, one cannot stop simply at the fact that the limited review afforded by writs of error was unavailable in criminal cases. Some aspects of the type of appellate review that we take for granted today were also part of the federal criminal justice system at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It is relevant to set the question in the context of the criminal caseload of the time.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, commentators assumed that federal crimes would be confined to a small class of cases dealing with treason, revenue offenses, counterfeiting and crimes committed on the high seas or against the law of nations.
188
In reality, the actual business of our first federal trial courts was 186 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 610. See also E. SURRENCY, supra note 148, at 215-16 (absence of criminal review in the First Judiciary Act due to lack of familiarly of eighteenth English lawyers with criminal procedure, since counsel in criminal cases in England was not allowed until the nineteenth century).
187 SeeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 39, at 610. 188 See, e.g., Letters from "A Federal Farmer" (Oct. 10, 1787), in H. STORING, supra note 156, at 53. This statement about what the scope of federal criminal law would be was made by a prominent anti-Federalist, whom one would expect to have exaggerated the case of the dangerous prospect that federal crimes presented in the context of an argument against ratifying the Constitution. composed of ordinary civil disputes, admiralty cases, and actions designed to aid the power of the federal government to impose import duties. 18 9 Only a small number of federal crimes existed, 190 and few such cases made their way to court. From 1790 to 1797, in all of the federal circuit court system, there were only one hundred forty-three criminal matters, or four percent of the total cases on the docket.' 9 ' Moreover, of this one hundred forty-three total, fully fifty-six came from Pennsylvania and were related to the Whiskey Rebellion trials.' 9 2 Truly, criminal trials played a very minor role in the business of the early federal courts.
E.
FEATURES OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS bench at each defendant's trial, the format offered some assurance that the results the court reached on constitutional questions reflected, in some measure, the institutional view of the Supreme Court as a whole. The dynamic of having a trial panel reflect the view of the full court was a familiar one to American lawyers. Judge Brackenridge of Pennsylvania reported an 1803 case in his book, Law Miscellanies, which noted the effect of having two of the four appellate judges preside at nisi prius trials:
[t]hat the court being constituted of but four judges, in the case of a reference to two, there could not be a majority out of four to reverse the opinion of two; a reason which it is well known did operate much at the nisi prius courts to prevent appeals or motions in bank from that which we had discovered to be the sense of the one half of the court who had already heard the matter, considering such a motion or appeal to be unavailing .... 195 
Post-Conviction Motions
Despite the lack of writs of error, several mechanisms existed at the time of the First Judiciary Act to review federal criminal convictions. Unlike the practice in England, 96 the American system allowed defendants to obtain review of their convictions by directing a motion in arrest ofjudgment or a motion for a new trial to the same court that convicted them. 19 7 Thus, defendants were not limited to the first judgment *of a legal issue raised and determined in their criminal trials. It is likely that motions in arrest of judgment were available to defendants from the very beginning of the federal judiciary. The defense attorney in the first capital conviction ever obtained in a federal court, for example, attacked his client's conviction on a motion in arrest of judgment, claiming the indictment was defective. 198 Similarly, the First Judiciary Act provided that all of the courts of the United States had the power to grant new trials.' 9 9 Federal trial courts considered a number of cases on motions for new trial. 20 0 One of the first reported instances of a motion for a new trial in a federal criminal case came in the 1799 trial of John Fries in the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania. 20 ' Fries was charged with treason as a result of his involvement with the insurrection in Northampton County over the issue of tax collection. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defense attorneys moved for a new trial. The prosecutor doubted the power of the court to order a new trial in a criminal case, but the judges could see no reason to allow such a remedy in civil trials and to exclude it in criminal cases where a man's life was at stake. Of the three issues raised in the new trial motion, only one had been argued previously before the judges. At the start of the trial, Fries' counsel had moved without success to change the venue to the county where the treasonous acts were alleged to have occurred. 20 3 The new trial motion argued that the presiding magistrates, Iredell and Peters, did not place sufficient justification in the record for denying the change of venue. Judge Iredell took great offense at this argument, both because the basic question about the venue of the trial had already been decided and because of the suggestion that he had erred in not placing his reasons for the earlier decision on the record. 20 4 Fries' attorney met the judge's ire with both an apology and an explanation. He stated that he was sorry he had given the court grounds for discomfort, but pointed out that in criminal prosecutions, especially capital cases, the job of defense counsel was to put forward every ground on behalf of his client. As it was common for courts to err, counsel was duty bound to point out the error and argue that the mistake was of sufficient consequence to afford his client relief. If the court agreed, it was fully authorized to retract from its former opinion. 20 6 Nothing further seems to have been made of this dispute, and the court went on to consider the other two grounds asserted in the new trial motion. 20 7 sues to an individual trialjudge. Eighteenth century federal defendants had an absolute right to have a multi-judge panel, which originally included one-third of the bench of the Supreme Court. These judges not only made the original determination of an issue at trial, but could also be called upon to reconsider their rulings after a conviction by the use of motions in arrest ofjudgment or for a new trial. Indeed, only a few years after the adoption of the Constitution, defendants had access to the discretionary review mechanism afforded by the certification procedure.
In Jones v. Barnes, Justice Brennan, dissenting with Justice Marshall, took the Court to task for unnecessarily repeating the disclaimer about a constitutional right to appeal. He went on to argue:
If the question were to come before us in a proper case, I have little doubt that the passage of some 90 years since McKane vs. Durston... would lead us to reassess ... I also have little doubt that we would decide that a state must afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of appeal or through some form of collateral proceeding. There are few, if any, situations in our system ofjustice in which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state court, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.... Of course, a case presenting this question is unlikely to arise, for the very reason that a right of appeal is now universal for all significant criminal convictions.
2
If it is ever appropriate for history to foreclose debate over the meaning of a part of the Constitution, the issue of a requirement for some means of review of criminal convictions does not qualify. The question should be open to further inquiry.
